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Conclusion of a nuclear arms deal has infused US-Russian relations with a new sense of optimism reminiscent of the late
1980s amid indications that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s bid to “reset” relations with Moscow has borne fruit, and the
phantom of a new “Cold War,” perceived by gloomy pundits in recent times, has faded at last. It is as if Washington and
Moscow have resolved to resume their relationship from a historic point it had reached before Russia, convulsed by post-
Soviet agony of defeat and impotence, spoiled America’s triumphant nineties with mean barking in Eastern Europe and
devious plots, hatched in partnership with China, to ruin US-led new world order. Obama and Medvedev can stand tall
shoulder-to-shoulder as once Gorbachev and Reagan had stood before a dawn of new partnership, and a promising future for
the world.
Yet, in some respects, recent breakthroughs in US-Russian arms negotiations bring to mind not so much the hopeful late
1980s as the sober early 1970s, when US President Richard Nixon and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev presided over the
conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and the broader détente it represented for Soviet-US relations. At the time
the Soviet leadership hailed détente as an outcome of US acceptance of Soviet “equality”; for Brezhnev, détente symbolized
his own legitimacy as a peacemaker and a ruler of a superpower. But better relations with Washington did not constrain Soviet
foreign policy. By contrast, the Soviet Union became more assertive on the international stage, supporting quasi-revolutionary
movements and militant clients, especially in Africa and the Middle East. Détente also had little effect on the Kremlin’s
domestic struggle with dissidents of various stripes: screws were tightened, and opponents of the Soviet regime were silenced
in prisons and asylums, or deported overseas.
Unfortunately, the “resetting” of US-Russian relations does not add up to a promising partnership Gorbachev and Reagan once
looked forward to. There is no reason to think that the Kremlin will hold punches in the immediate neighborhood (e.g. Georgia
or Ukraine) to please the Americans; by contrast, the legitimizing aura of an upbeat relationship with the United States will
embolden Moscow to act with greater confidence vis-à-vis embittered foes of Russia’s regional hegemony. There is no doubt,
on the other hand, that whatever may transpire in US-Russian relations, the Russian leadership will ruthlessly and consistently
suppress domestic dissent, which had grown considerably in the last two years in view of deteriorating economic conditions
and endemic corruption.
The Obama Administration may well close their eyes to these aspects of Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, and even
ridicule critics for being unrealistic or moralistic, or ignoring Russia’s legitimate interests. In this respect, the lessons of the
early 1970s are all the more pertinent. After all, who can argue that the moral relativism of Nixon and Kissinger were
exceptionally useful in the making of triangular diplomacy, which had placed the US, demoralized by the Vietnam War and
economic woes, in a position to play one foe (the USSR) against the other (China). But Obama is inconsistent, for although he
has been willing to push for a better relationship with Russia, come what may, he has also antagonized China by selling
weapons to Taiwan and complaining about the human rights’ record in the People’s Republic. Triangular diplomacy of the
Obama-Clinton team has not worked out so well.
Circumstances change but history repeats itself. The détente of the 1970s was followed by the Second Cold War and new lows
in Soviet-US relations. The dynamic of the Kremlin’s domestic and foreign policies maintains Russia on a course, which will
only widen US-Russian antagonisms in the years ahead. I am not even confident that the prospects of Russia’s support for the
US vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea have improved significantly with the “resetting” of relations; the Kremlin will do what it has
done in the last few years – look after its own interests in both regions, and these are not so much to see that the lingering
problems are resolved, but that they are not resolved on US terms. In the 1970s Nixon and Kissinger pioneered the concept of
“linkage”: offering the prospect of better relations with the USSR in exchange for Moscow’s self-imposed moderation and
cooperative attitude on a range of issues important to the US. It did not exactly work then. It will not work now.
7/5/2017 US-Russian Relations and Disarmament | International Affairs at LSE
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ideas/2010/03/us-russian-relations-and-disarmament/ 2/2
Sergey Radchenko is a lecturer in Asian-American Relations at the University of Nottingham (Chinese campus). He is based
in Ningbo, China and a Fellow of the LSE IDEAS Cold War Studies Programme.
This entry was posted in Russia, The Wall. Bookmark the permalink.
